Federal Aviation Administration

Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA): Mx Operations – Line

Training Scenarios

Observer Training

Before beginning this portion of the training please:

Download and install a free copy of the Maintenance LOSA software

https://hfskyway.faa.gov/HFSkyway/MLosaHome.aspx

General Guidelines

- **The form is a guide and a place to record data for later analysis**
  - Do not need to observe everything on the forms
    - Observing and taking “samples” of behaviors in the hangar or shop or on the ramp
    - Form is not in the spirit of a starting engine or pre-takeoff checklist
  - The observer as a Subject Matter Expert (SME) will probably notice threats and errors without needing the form as a cue
  - Can take notes during observation and then fill in the forms later

Preparation

- **Take a few minutes before an observation to review the form**
  - Make a general plan for your observations
  - Be open to changing your plan and look for the unexpected

Observation Example

Situation

A technician was observed performing routine maintenance on an ATR-42. While closing out the aircraft at night during a Remain Over Night (RON) check from a RON work card. The work card listed the systems that needed to be checked but did not include instruction to secure the main battery switch. The technician left the main battery switch on. Another more experienced technician, was assisting with closing the aircraft with him, and found the main battery switch on, it was switched off correcting the first technician's error.

AVIALL
SERVICE RECORD
DATE: 11-4-09
DUE: 2-4-2010
CAUTION
MAINTAIN ONLY IN ACCORDANCE
WITH SAFT MAINTENANCE MANUA
USE DISTILLED OR DEIONIZED
WATER. ANY TRACE OF ACID WI
PERMANENTLY DESTROY CELLS.
Nickel Cadmium Battery
Type 40176-7
Nominal Voltage 24 V
Weight 37.3 kg/ 82 lbs
Dwg No. 016392-000
Capacity at 1 hour Rate 36 Ah
Ser No. 087767
Date of Manufacture 0897
BOEING P/N 6B40817-7
SAFT, VALDOSTA, GA 31601 · Made in USA
BATTERY M6
D1444
EXT PWR-DC

LOSA Observation Form

Threat Codes Legend	
Mx/A. Information Mx/B. Equipment / Tools / Safety Equipment Mx/C. Aircraft Design / Configuration / Parts Mx/D. Job / Task	Mx/G. Environment / Facilities Mx/H. Organizational Factors Mx/I. Leadership / Supervision Mx/J. Communication Mx/K. Quality Control Mx/L. Other Contributing

9. Close-up/Complete Restore

Observation Number:_____ ☐ Did not observe this section

		Safety Risk N/A, Safe (S), At Risk (AR), Didn't Observe (DNO)	Threat Code (See Threat Codes List)	Threat Effectively Managed Y/N	Error Outcome 1.Inconsequential 2.Undesired state 3.Additional error & Remarks
	Safety				
1	Notes, cautions, and warnings reviewed				
2	Notes, cautions, and warnings followed				
	Personnel				
3	Required personnel available				
	Parts & Materials				
4	Parts, materials, and wastes dispositioned				
	Procedures				
5	Servicing procedures followed				
6	Required reactivation and restoration procedures followed				
7	Required reactivation and restoration				

Threat Codes

T-A. Information

T-B. Equipment / Tools / Safety Equipment

T-C. Aircraft Design / Configuration / Parts

T-D. Job / Task

T-E. Knowledge / Skills

T-F. Individual Factors

T-G. Environment / Facilities

T-H. Organizational Factors

T-I. Leadership / Supervision

T-J. Communication

T-K. Quality Control

T-L. Other Contributing Factors

Form Section:
6. Servicing

- **"At Risk" item: SERVICING PROCEDURES FOLLOWED**
  - Information → T-A9 Information Not Used
  - Knowledge/skills→ T-E5 (Task knowledge), T-E8 (Aircraft system knowledge)
  - Organizational Factors → T-H8 Work practice/procedure not followed
  - Communication → T-J3 (Shift change)
- **Effectively Managed? → Yes**
- **Error Outcomes → Inconsequential**

A. Information (e.g. work cards, maintenance manuals, service bulletins, maintenance tips, non-routines, IPC, warning/signal, etc.)

T-A1. Not understandable

T-A2. Unavailable or inaccessible

T-A3. Incorrect

T-A4. Inadequate (e.g., missing graphics)

T-A5. Uncontrolled (e.g., outdated)

T-A6. Too much conflicting information

T-A7. Update process is too long or complicated

T-A8. Incorrectly modified manufacturer's Maintenance Manual/Service Bulletin

T-A9. Information not used

T-A10. Other (explain below)

E. Knowledge / Skills

T-E1. Technical skills

T-E2. Computer skills

T-E3. Teamwork skills

T-E4. English proficiency

T-E5. Task knowledge

T-E6. Task planning

T-E7. Company process knowledge

T-E8. Aircraft system knowledge

T-E9. Other (explain below)

H. Organizational Factors

T-H1. Quality of internal support from technical organizations (e.g., engineering, planning, technical pubs)

T-H2. Quality of external support from technical organizations (e.g., manufacturer)

T-H3. Company policies

T-H4. Not enough staff

T-H5. Corporate change / restructuring

T-H6. Labor action

T-H7. Work process / procedure

T-H8. Work process / procedure not followed

T-H9. Work process / procedure not documented

T-H10. Work group normal practice (norm)

T-H11. Team building

T-H12. Other (explain below)

J. Communication

T-J1. Between departments

T-J2. Between mechanics

T-J3. Between shifts

T-J4. Between maintenance crew and lead

T-J5. Between lead and management

T-J6. Between flight crew and maintenance

T-J7. Other (explain below)

LOSA Observation Form

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9. Close-up/Complete Restore

Observation Number:_____ ☐ Did not observe this section

		Safety Risk N/A, Safe (S), At Risk (AR), Didn't Observe (DNO)	Threat Code (See Threat Codes List)	Threat Effectively Managed Y/N	Error Outcome 1.Inconsequential 2.Undesired state 3.Additional error & Remarks
	Safety				
1	Notes, cautions, and warnings reviewed	S			
2	Notes, cautions, and warnings followed	S			
	Personnel				
3	Required personnel available	S			
	Parts & Materials				
4	Parts, materials, and wastes dispositioned	S			
	Procedures				
5	Servicing procedures followed	AR	A9, E5, E8, H8, J3	Y	1. Inconsequential
6	Required reactivation and restoration procedures followed	S			
7	Required reactivation and restoration	S			

Additional Comments

Describe the threat(s). How did the technician(s) manage or mismanage the threat(s)?
They sent us one of the base mx guys because we were short. He did bring the RON work card for the close out. The work card listed the systems that needed to be checked but did not have instruction to secure the main battery switch. The technician left the main battery switch on. One of our senior line guys was also on the close out and found the main battery switch on.
Describe the technician error(s) and associated undesired states
Nothing came of this but we would almost had a dead aircraft in the morning.
Comments - Good or bad (Please provide examples)
When we have inexperienced mechanics we should have a second set of eyes if we have the manpower.

Practice Observations

Practice Observation Instructions

- **Please complete the appropriate section of the observation form for each of the following scenarios**

- **Identify and mark down the threats and errors and include any remarks**

- **Following your observation please enter your information into the Mx LOSA software database**

Scenario #1:
Rag Left in Equipment Bay

Situation

A technician was in the aft equipment bay searching for fluid leaks in the aft equipment bay of a CRJ-700. The LOSA observer noticed that a technician left a rag which was stuck in one of the control pulleys. A second technician found and removed the rag during the final check before closing the bay.

LOSA Observation Form

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9. Close-up/Complete Restore

Observation Number:_____ ☐ Did not observe this section

		Safety Risk N/A, Safe (S), At Risk (AR), Didn't Observe (DNO)	Threat Code (See Threat Codes List)	Threat Effectively Managed Y/N	Error Outcome 1.Inconsequential 2.Undesired state 3.Additional error & Remarks
	Safety				
1	Notes, cautions, and warnings reviewed				
2	Notes, cautions, and warnings followed				
	Personnel				
3	Required personnel available				
	Parts & Materials				
4	Parts, materials, and wastes dispositioned				
	Procedures				
5	Servicing procedures followed				
6	Required reactivation and restoration procedures followed				
7	Required reactivation and restoration				

Threat Codes

T-A. Information

T-B. Equipment / Tools / Safety Equipment

T-C. Aircraft Design / Configuration / Parts

T-D. Job / Task

T-E. Knowledge / Skills

T-F. Individual Factors

T-G. Environment / Facilities

T-H. Organizational Factors

T-I. Leadership / Supervision

T-J. Communication

T-K. Quality Control

T-L. Other Contributing Factors

Your sheets and software entries should contain something similar to the following…

- **"At Risk" item #4: Parts, materials, and wastes dispositioned**
  - Individuals Factors→ *T-F9 Individual Factors- Memory Lapse (forgot)*
  - *Environment/Facilities → T-G19 Restricted/confined Work Area*
- **Effectively Managed? ➔ Yes**
- **Error Outcomes ➔ Inconsequential**

F. Individual Factors

T-F1. Physical health (including hearing and sight)

T-F2. Fatigue

T-F3. Time pressure

T-F4. Peer pressure

T-F5. Complacency

T-F6. Body size/strength

T-F7. Personal event (e.g., family problem, car accident)

T-F8. Workplace distractions or interruptions during task performance

T-F9. Memory lapse (forgot)

T-F10. Visual perception

T-F11. Assertiveness

T-F12. Stress

T-F13. Situational awareness

T-F14. Not properly dressed (e.g., for weather)

T-F15. Other (explain below)

G. Environment / Facilities

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T-G8. Illumination

T-G9. Wind

T-G10. Jet blast

T-G11. Vibrations

T-G12. Cleanliness

T-G13. Hazardous or toxic substances

T-G14. Contaminated surfaces

T-G15. Power sources

T-G16. Inadequate ventilation

T-G17. Slippery

T-G18. Uneven work surface

T-G19. Restricted/confined work area

T-G20. Elevated work space

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LOSA Observation Form

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9. Close-up/Complete Restore

Observation Number:_____ ☐ Did not observe this section

		Safety Risk N/A, Safe (S), At Risk (AR), Didn't Observe (DNO)	Threat Code (See Threat Codes List)	Threat Effectively Managed Y/N	Error Outcome 1.Inconsequential 2.Undesired state 3.Additional error & Remarks
	Safety				
1	Notes, cautions, and warnings reviewed	DNO			
2	Notes, cautions, and warnings followed	S			
	Personnel				
3	Required personnel available	S			
	Parts & Materials				
4	Parts, materials, and wastes dispositioned	AR	T-F9, T-G19	N	2. Undesired state
	Procedures				
5	Servicing procedures followed	S			

Additional Comments

Describe the threat(s). How did the technician(s) manage or mismanage the threat(s)?
Two mechanics came out for the first flight of the day because of 'Fluid leak from APU.' The Captain had the aft equipment bay door open because he thought “the leak was coming from the ACM in the equipment bay, not the APU.“ One mechanic entered the aft equipment bay and tightened the moisture/condenser unit clamp to the forward duct. The second technician handed him some rags and went to retrieve the logbook, because the aircraft was already boarded. When the second technician came back, the first technician told him to check the equipment bay. The second technician found and removed a rag during his final check.
Describe the technician error(s) and associated undesired states
The mechanic in the equipment bay did not do a good enough check on his way out. The rag he left behind was caught in one of the control pulleys so this was not a small problem.
Comments - Good or bad (Please provide examples)
Final checks and accounting for all materials are critical. This could have been a bad situation.

Scenario #2:
MEL Violation

Situation

A line technician deferred inoperative ground power lights on an B737 aircraft which was allowed by the Minimum Equipment List (MEL). However he did not carry out the maintenance procedure as required by the MEL. The procedure that verifies that the avionics vent fan warning horn is operative on the ground was not performed.

EXTERNAL
CONN
INTERPHONE
FLIGHT
SERVICE
PILOT
NOSE
ON
NORM
LIGHT
NOT
IN USE
CALL

2. Fault Isolation/Troubleshooting/Deferral

Observation Number:_____ ☐ Did not observe this section

		Safety Risk N/A, Safe (S), At Risk (AR), Didn't Observe (DNO)	Threat Code (See Threat Codes List)	Threat Effectively Managed Y/N	Error Outcome 1.Inconsequential 2.Undesired state 3.Additional error & Remarks
	Safety				
1	Notes, cautions, and warnings				
18	Properly identified as deferrable				
19	Maintenance action properly executed				
20	Maintenance log updated				
21	Close up procedures followed				
	Communication & Coordination				
22	Supervision/logistics support responded when needed				
23	Communication among crew members accomplished				

Threat Codes

T-A. Information

T-B. Equipment / Tools / Safety Equipment

T-C. Aircraft Design / Configuration / Parts

T-D. Job / Task

T-E. Knowledge / Skills

T-F. Individual Factors

T-G. Environment / Facilities

T-H. Organizational Factors

T-I. Leadership / Supervision

T-J. Communication

T-K. Quality Control

T-L. Other Contributing Factors

Errors and Threats

Error--"At Risk" item: 2.19 Maintenance action properly executed.

- **Threats**
  - Information → T-A9 (Information not used)
  - Organizational Factors → T-H8 (Work process/procedure not followed)
- **Effectively Managed? ➔ No**
- **Error Outcomes ➔ Undesired state (A/C would have been dispatched in a non airworthy condition)**

A. Information (e.g. work cards, maintenance manuals, service bulletins, maintenance tips, non-routines, IPC, warning/signal, etc.)

T-A1. Not understandable

T-A2. Unavailable or inaccessible

T-A3. Incorrect

T-A4. Inadequate (e.g., missing graphics)

T-A5. Uncontrolled (e.g., outdated)

T-A6. Too much conflicting information

T-A7. Update process is too long or complicated

T-A8. Incorrectly modified manufacturer's Maintenance Manual/Service Bulletin

T-A9. Information not used

T-A10. Other (explain below)

H. Organizational Factors

T-H1. Quality of internal support from technical organizations (e.g., engineering, planning, technical pubs)

T-H2. Quality of external support from technical organizations (e.g., manufacturer)

T-H3. Company policies

T-H4. Not enough staff

T-H5. Corporate change / restructuring

T-H6. Labor action

T-H7. Work process / procedure

T-H8. Work process / procedure not followed

T-H9. Work process / procedure not documented

T-H10. Work group normal practice (norm)

T-H11. Team building

T-H12. Other (explain below)

2. Fault Isolation/Troubleshooting/Deferral

Observation Number:_____ ☐ Did not observe this section

		Safety Risk N/A, Safe (S), At Risk (AR), Didn't Observe (DNO)	Threat Code (See Threat Codes List)	Threat Effectively Managed Y/N	Error Outcome 1.Inconsequential 2.Undesired state 3.Additional error & Remarks
	Safety				
1	Notes, cautions, and warnings reviewed	S			
2	Notes, cautions, and warnings				
18	Properly identified as deferrable	AR	T-A9 T-H8	N	2. Undesired state
19	Maintenance action properly executed	AR	T-A9 T-H8	N	2. Undesired state
20	Maintenance log updated	S			
21	Close up procedures followed	S			
	Communication & Coordination				
22	Supervision/logistics support responded when needed	DNO			
23	Communication among crew members accomplished	DNO			

Additional Comments

Describe the threat(s). How did the technician(s) manage or mismanage the threat(s)?
A line technician found that three of four ground power lights were inop on test. He checked the MEL in the Operating Manual for ground power lights. He thought the power light was secondary and that the aircraft was serviceable since only the light function was out.
Describe the technician error(s) and associated undesired states
I told the line technician before he dispatched the aircraft that he needed to complete the check on the avionics vent fan horn. He was ready to dispatch this aircraft with an illegal deferral.
Comments - Good or bad (Please provide examples)
All of the safety nets failed on this. I had to intervene and have him do the checks before he dispatched this unairworthy aircraft.

Scenario #3:
Engine Oil Filler Cap

Situation

An inexperienced line technician was servicing oil on the right engine on a B737-800 two hours after engine shutdown. The technician was observed putting on the oil filler cap, but did not lock it down. A lead technician standing nearby saw that it was not locked and corrected the problem. The technician was unfamiliar with the cap.


STARTER
MOBIL JET
OIL 254
MOBIL JET
OIL 254
CLOSE
OPEN
OIL CAPACITY


CAPACITY

LOSA Observation Form

Threat Codes Legend	
Mx/A. Information Mx/B. Equipment / Tools / Safety Equipment Mx/C. Aircraft Design / Configuration / Parts Mx/D. Job / Task	Mx/G. Environment / Facilities Mx/H. Organizational Factors Mx/I. Leadership / Supervision Mx/J. Communication Mx/K. Quality Control Mx/L. Other Contributing

6. Servicing

Observation Number:_____

☐ Did not observe this section

		Safety Risk N/A, Safe (S), At Risk (AR), Didn't Observe (DNO)	Threat Code (See Threat Codes List)	Threat Effectively Managed Y/N	Error Outcome 1.Inconsequential 2.Undesired state 3.Additional error & Remarks
	Safety				
1	Notes, cautions, and warnings reviewed				
2	Notes, cautions, and warnings				
15	Open up procedures followed				
16	Proper cool down/drain down/temperature requirements observed				
17	Replenishment procedures followed				
18	Close up procedures followed				
	Communication & Coordination				
19	Supervision/logistics support				

Threat Codes

T-A. Information

T-B. Equipment / Tools / Safety Equipment

T-C. Aircraft Design / Configuration / Parts

T-D. Job / Task

T-E. Knowledge / Skills

T-F. Individual Factors

T-G. Environment / Facilities

T-H. Organizational Factors

T-I. Leadership / Supervision

T-J. Communication

T-K. Quality Control

T-L. Other Contributing Factors

Form Section: "6. Servicing"

"At Risk" item: CLOSE UP PROCEDURES FOLLOWED

- Job/task→ T-E5 (Task Knowledge)

- **Effectively Managed? ➔ Yes**
- **Error Outcomes ➔ Inconsequential**

E. Knowledge / Skills

T-E1. Technical skills

T-E2. Computer skills

T-E3. Teamwork skills

T-E4. English proficiency

T-E5. Task knowledge

T-E6. Task planning

T-E7. Company process knowledge

T-E8. Aircraft system knowledge

T-E9. Other (explain below)

LOSA Observation Form

Threat Codes Legend	
Mx/A. Information Mx/B. Equipment / Tools / Safety Equipment Mx/C. Aircraft Design / Configuration / Parts Mx/D. Job / Task	Mx/G. Environment / Facilities Mx/H. Organizational Factors Mx/I. Leadership / Supervision Mx/J. Communication Mx/K. Quality Control Mx/L. Other Contributing

6. Servicing

Observation Number:_____

☐ Did not observe this section

		Safety Risk N/A, Safe (S), At Risk (AR), Didn't Observe (DNO)	Threat Code (See Threat Codes List)	Threat Effectively Managed Y/N	Error Outcome 1.Inconsequential 2.Undesired state 3.Additional error & Remarks
	Safety				
1	Notes, cautions, and warnings reviewed	DNO			
2	Notes, cautions, and warnings	S			
15	Open up procedures followed	S			
16	Proper cool down/drain down/temperature requirements observed	S			
17	Replenishment procedures followed	S			
18	Close up procedures followed	AR	T-E5	Y	1. Inconsequential
	Communication & Coordination				
19	Supervision/logistics support	S			

Additional Comments

Describe the threat(s). How did the technician(s) manage or mismanage the threat(s)?
I was observing an inexperienced line technician servicing oil on the right engine on a B737-800. He waited two hours after engine shutdown so there was no issue with drain down.
Describe the technician error(s) and associated undesired states
The technician didn't lock the oil filler cap down. A lead tech saw that it was not locked and showed the new tech what needed to be done.
Comments - Good or bad (Please provide examples)
This was a good example of a lead tech doing his job by working with the inexperienced technician.

Scenario #4:
757 Blind Oil Fill

Scenario #4: 757 Blind Oil Fill

The crew of a B757-200 called with the #2 engine EICAS showing only 7 quarts static at the gate. Because of time pressure, the lead technician had a line technician do a blind fill of 14 quarts of oil without running the engine first.

FULL
U.S. QUARTS REQUIRED
LITRES REQUIRED
OVER
FLOW

LOSA Observation Form

Threat Codes Legend	
Mx/A. Information Mx/B. Equipment / Tools / Safety Equipment Mx/C. Aircraft Design / Configuration / Parts Mx/D. Job / Task	Mx/G. Environment / Facilities Mx/H. Organizational Factors Mx/I. Leadership / Supervision Mx/J. Communication Mx/K. Quality Control Mx/L. Other Contributing

6. Servicing

Observation Number:_____

☐ Did not observe this section

		Safety Risk N/A, Safe (S), At Risk (AR), Didn't Observe (DNO)	Threat Code (See Threat Codes List)	Threat Effectively Managed Y/N	Error Outcome 1.Inconsequential 2.Undesired state 3.Additional error & Remarks
	Safety				
1	Notes, cautions, and warnings reviewed				
2	Notes, cautions, and warnings				
15	Open up procedures followed				
16	Proper cool down/drain down/temperature requirements observed				
17	Replenishment procedures followed				
18	Close up procedures followed				
	Communication & Coordination				
19	Supervision/logistics support				

Threat Codes

T-A. Information

T-B. Equipment / Tools / Safety Equipment

T-C. Aircraft Design / Configuration / Parts

T-D. Job / Task

T-E. Knowledge / Skills

T-F. Individual Factors

T-G. Environment / Facilities

T-H. Organizational Factors

T-I. Leadership / Supervision

T-J. Communication

T-K. Quality Control

T-L. Other Contributing Factors

Errors and Threats

- **Error "At Risk" items:**
  - 1.12 Documentation available and reviewed
  - 1.16 Proper cool down/drain down/temperature requirements observed
  - 1.17 Replenishment procedures followed
- **Threats**
  - Information → T-A9 Information not used
  - Individual Factors → T-F3 Time pressure
  - Organizational Factors → T-H8 Work process/procedure not followed; T-H10 Work group normal practice (norm)
  - T-I6 Other (explain) *Lead instructed technician to act against procedure*
- **Effectively Managed? → No**
- **Error Outcomes → Undesired state (overfilled oil reservoir)**

A. Information (e.g. work cards, maintenance manuals, service bulletins, maintenance tips, non-routines, IPC, warning/signal, etc.)

T-A1. Not understandable

T-A2. Unavailable or inaccessible

T-A3. Incorrect

T-A4. Inadequate (e.g., missing graphics)

T-A5. Uncontrolled (e.g., outdated)

T-A6. Too much conflicting information

T-A7. Update process is too long or complicated

T-A8. Incorrectly modified manufacturer's Maintenance Manual/Service Bulletin

T-A9. Information not used

T-A10. Other (explain below)

F. Individual Factors

T-F1. Physical health (including hearing and sight)

T-F2. Fatigue

T-F3. Time pressure

T-F4. Peer pressure

T-F5. Complacency

T-F6. Body size/strength

T-F7. Personal event (e.g., family problem, car accident)

T-F8. Workplace distractions or interruptions during task performance

T-F9. Memory lapse (forgot)

…

H. Organizational Factors

T-H1. Quality of internal support from technical organizations (e.g., engineering, planning, technical pubs)

T-H2. Quality of external support from technical organizations (e.g., manufacturer)

T-H3. Company policies

T-H4. Not enough staff

T-H5. Corporate change / restructuring

T-H6. Labor action

T-H7. Work process / procedure

T-H8. Work process / procedure not followed

T-H9. Work process / procedure not documented

T-H10. Work group normal practice (norm)

T-H11. Team building

T-H12. Other (explain below)

T-I. Leadership / Supervision

T-I1. Planning / organization of tasks

T-I2. Prioritization of work

T-I3. Delegation / assignment of task

T-I4. Unrealistic attitude / expectations

T-I5. Availability of supervision

T-I6. Other (explain below)

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6. Servicing

Observation Number:_____

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		Safety Risk N/A, Safe (S), At Risk (AR), Didn't Observe (DNO)	Threat Code (See Threat Codes List)	Threat Effectively Managed Y/N	Error Outcome 1.Inconsequential 2.Undesired state 3.Additional error & Remarks
	Safety				
1	Notes, cautions and warnings				
	Procedures				
12	Documentation available and reviewed (e.g., task cards, maintenance manuals, service bulletins)	*AR*	*T-A9 T-F3*	*N*	*2. Undesired state*
13	Effectivity/configuration verified	*S*			
14	Hazardous energy systems (electrical, hydraulics, pneumatics, stored energy) deactivation LOTO procedures verified	*S*			
15	Open up procedures followed	*S*			
16	Proper cool down/drain down/temperature requirements observed	*AR*	*T-F3*	*N*	*2. Undesired state*
17	Replenishment procedures followed	*AR*	*T-I6*	*N*	*2. Undesired state*
18	Close up procedures followed	*S*			
	Communication & Coordination				

Additional Comments

Describe the threat(s). How did the technician(s) manage or mismanage the threat(s)?
A flight crew called requesting oil service for #2 engine due to EICAS reading 7 quarts static. The flight crew would not a maintenance runs so the lead technician had a line technician do a blind oil fill. The line technician added 14 quarts. It did not generate a red alert automated log in the maintenance computer. The crew ran the engine for 10 minutes with no leaks or problems.
Describe the technician error(s) and associated undesired states
This was one of those few times when I had to intervene as a LOSA observer. They checked the level and fortunately it was within limits.
Comments - Good or bad (Please provide examples)
Another one of those times when nothing bad happened but could have. We are heading down a slippery slope with this type of norm.

This Concludes the Training Module

Acknowledgement:

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY